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The reconciliation step of continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols usually involves 
forward error correction codes. Matching the code rate and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the 
quantum channel is required to achieve the high reconciliation efficiencies that are crucial for long 
distance links. Puncturing and shortening is a way to adapt the code rate to the SNR at the cost of a 
slightly reduced reconciliation efficiencies. Instead of adapting the code rate to the SNR, we propose 
to add a controlled amount of artificial noise to the measured data, so that the resulting SNR could 
be reduced to match the given code rate. We show that our method can compete with puncturing and 
shortening and even outperform it in high-loss, high-excess noise scenarios. 
Introduction 
In continuous-variable QKD [1], Alice and Bob are provided with correlated analogue data from the 
quantum channel. This correlation provides mutual information 𝐼AB to Alice and Bob. During an 
information reconciliation step, they exploit this mutual information to obtain a common bit sequence. 
A common approach is to use mathematical transformations to map their correlated noise to a virtual 
binary channel with additive white gaussian noise (BAWGNC). A simple option for the low-SNR regime 
is multidimensional reconciliation [2], [3], another important option is slice reconciliation, which also 
works for higher SNRs [4], [5]. Both reconciliation protocols use soft-decision forward error correction 
(FEC) codes to obtain an error-free bit sequence from the noisy virtual binary channel. In continuous-
variable QKD, the mutual information shared by Alice and Bob 𝐼AB is often only slightly larger than the 
upper bound of the information an attacker Eve could have obtained (the so-called Holevo bound 𝜒). An 
efficient exploitation of the mutual information is therefore crucial for a secret key exchange: If the bit 
sequence held by Alice and Bob after reconciliation is shorter than the Holevo bound on Eves 
information, the extraction of a secret key is impossible. The length of the secret key depends on the 
secret fraction per transmitted symbol 𝑟 which is defined via the number of bits reconciled per symbol 
𝑏 and the Holevo bound 𝜒 on Eves information (also per symbol) as 𝑟 = 𝑏 − 𝜒. Consequently, 𝑏 = 𝛽 𝐼AB 
should be as high as possible for a given mutual information 𝐼AB (per symbol), and hence the 
reconciliation efficiency 𝛽 should be maximized. In practice, ideal efficiency 𝛽 = 1 cannot be achieved, 
because information is lost during the mapping from the quantum channel to the BAWGNC, or because 
the applied FEC requires a higher SNR (i.e. more mutual information) to correct a given number of 
payload bits than theoretically necessary. Most forward error correction codes of a given length 𝑁 can 
transport only a fixed number of bits 𝑘. They are said to have the code rate 𝑅 =  
𝑘
𝑁
. To achieve a given 
frame error rate, they require a certain minimum mutual information 𝐼BAWGNC,min = 𝑅/𝛽FEC,max. If the 
mutual information 𝐼BAWGNC is lower than 𝐼BAWGNC,min, the desired frame error rate cannot be achieved. 
If the mutual information is higher than this value, the number of transported bits is still the same 𝑏 =
𝛽𝐼AB ∝ 𝑅 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡. Consequently, the reconciliation efficiency 𝛽 = 𝑏/𝐼AB ≤ 𝑅/𝐼BAWGNC drops.  The 
Holevo bound 𝜒 on the other hand increases with higher SNR, reducing the secret fraction 𝑟 = 𝑏 − 𝜒. 
Therefore, it is important to have the ability to match code rate and mutual information (which is 
strongly linked to the SNR). Because of possibly unpredictable variations in the quality of the quantum 
channel, a-priori matching the signal power or mixing analogue noise into the signal is not sufficient. 
Instead, the ability for code rate matching during post processing is required. Via puncturing and 
shortening [6], [7] it is possible to change the code rate. The applicability of this approach to CV-QKD 
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has been demonstrated by Wang et al. [8]. However, puncturing and shortening comes at the cost of a 
reduction of the reconciliation efficiency 𝛽 by more than half a percent. While this is acceptable on short 
distances, it can make a secure key exchange impossible on long distances. Here we present the 
opposite approach to match code rate and mutual information: Instead of changing the code rate, we 
artificially reduce the mutual information.  
Results 
We discuss our approach on the example of prepare-and-measure Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD [9] 
using reverse reconciliation [10]. We assume that both quadratures are measured simultaneously via 
two balanced homodyne detectors [11]  [12]. 
A schematic of the QKD setup is shown in Fig. 1. Very recently, it was calculated how trusting the 
receiver noise and receiver quantum efficiency reduces the Holevo bound and thus increases the secret 
fraction [13]. Most interesting, it was found that in scenarios with bad channel transmittance and high 
channel noise, it can be beneficial to add noise on Bobs side [13], [14]. We use this effect to match the 
mutual information to the code rate. For this purpose, Bob deliberately adds digital Gaussian white 
noise to his measurement results during post processing. Using the formalism derived by Laudenbach 
and Pacher [13], we calculate the secret fraction for different channel excess noise 𝜉ch. We assume that 
multidimensional reconciliation and a multi-edge-type LDPC code of rate 𝑅 = 0.1 is used, yielding a 
reconciliation of efficiency 𝛽 = 93.95 %  [6], [8]. This implies that the reconciliation via this LDPC code 
requires a minimum SNR of 𝑆𝑁𝑅𝑅=0.1 = 2
2𝑅/𝛽 − 1 = 0.159. We further assume that we can trust the 
 𝑇rec =  0.7 and a trusted noise of 𝜉rec = 0.01. 
For each value of the channel excess noise 𝜉𝑐ℎ, the modulation variance 𝑉𝑚𝑜𝑑  was optimized to achieve 
maximum secret fraction 𝑟 under the constraint that the resulting SNR matches the capacity of the 
LDPC code. Since excess noise, modulation variance, transmittance and SNR are linked via 𝑆𝑁𝑅 =
𝑇 𝑉mod
2+𝜉ch+𝜉rec
, optimizing 𝑉𝑚𝑜𝑑  for fixed SNR and excess noise also yields a corresponding optimum 𝑇 =
𝑇ch𝑇rec. These optimum parameter sets are depicted as circles in Fig. 2. Keeping these parameter sets, 
only the channel transmittance was changed. Under the assumption that a code with the same 
reconciliation efficiency 𝛽 = 93.95 % is available for arbitrary code rates (i.e. for arbitrary SNRs), the 
secret fractions corresponding to the pale dashed lines can be achieved. On the other hand, if the same 
𝑅 = 0.1 code is always used for all SNRs without any attempts of matching SNR and code rate, much 
smaller secret fractions (pale lines) can be achieved. This drastic secret fraction penalty inflicted by 
non-matched code rates can be partly mitigated by shortening and puncturing [8]. However, the 
reconciliation efficiencies for shortened and punctured codes are lower than for the original code. The 
 
Figure 1 Schematic of the QKD setup. Alice samples quadratures q,p from a Gaussian distribution with variance Vmod, 
prepares corresponding coherent states and sends them over the optical channel to Bob. The channel has a 
transmittance 𝑇ch and adds excess noise 𝜉ch
receiver is described by 𝑇rec 𝜉rec to the signal. In the digital domain, 
Bob has the option to add extra noise 𝜉rec,artificial to the measured quadratures before using them for reconciliation. By 
doing so he matches the SNR to the FEC code used during reconciliation. 
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secret fractions corresponding to the values presented in ref. [8] are depicted as crosses. Instead of 
applying puncturing and shortening, Bob can add additional Gaussian white noise 𝜉rec,artificial =
𝑇𝑉mod
𝑆𝑁𝑅𝑅=0.1
− 2 − 𝜉ch − 𝜉rec  to his data. Thus, he can reduce the SNR and the mutual information between 
him and Alice to match the available reconciliation scheme and LDPC code. This approach is beneficial 
compared to directly using the available reconciliation scheme without any mitigation, because adding 
noise not only reduces the SNR, but also reduces the Holevo boun  𝜒. It was 
pointed out recently, that deliberately adding trusted noise can even increase the secret fraction in 
some scenarios [13]. This is also reflected by the calculations (solid lines). In most scenarios, adding 
the puncturing and shortening approach. 
Under delicate low-secret-fraction conditions, our approach delivers much higher secret fractions than 
the puncturing and shortening approach, because puncturing and shortening slightly reduces the 
reconciliation efficiency 𝛽 by approximately 0.5 % [8]. 
 
Figure 3 Code rate matching. The circles correspond to the optimum parameter set which yield the nominal SNR (0.159) 
of the 𝛽 = 93.95%,𝑅 = 0.1 code. The crosses correspond to the results obtained by Wang et al. [8] using puncturing and 
shorting. The curves depict the secret fraction that can be achieved when operating with an 15 %-increased 𝑉mod and 
when adding noise in order to match the mutual information to the code rate. 
  
Figure 2 Mitigation of transmittance increase-induced secret fraction drop for different channel excess noise values 
𝜉𝑐ℎ. The circles correspond to the optimum parameter set which yield the nominal SNR (0.159) of the 𝛽 = 93.95%,𝑅 =
0.1 code. The curves depict the secret fraction that can be achieved without rate-matching (pale solid lines), with a code 
of arbitrary rate and 𝛽 = 93.95% (pale dashed line), by adding noise for matching the mutual information to the code 
rate (solid lines). The crosses correspond to the results obtained by Wang et al. [8] using puncturing. 
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Up to here, our approach only mitigates transmittance increases whereas a decrease in transmittance 
would increase the frame error rate, ultimately rendering reconciliation impossible. Therefore, 
artificial noise needs to be added already at the operation point. Thus, if the transmittance decreases, 
rate-matching can be achieved by reducing the artificial noise. In order to be able to add artificial noise 
at the channel parameters corresponding to the operation point of the given scenario, we increase the 
modulation variance by 15 %. The resulting secret fraction is shown in Fig. 3 alongside the secret 
fraction that would result from the puncturing and shortening reconciliation efficiencies published by 
Wang et al. [8]. For low channel excess noise, puncturing and shortening yields higher secret fractions 
than our proposed method. However, when the channel excess noise is high and the secret fraction is 
low, rate-matching by adjusting the amount of artificial noise outperforms puncturing and shortening. 
Conclusion 
Using prepare-and-measure weak coherent Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD as an example, we 
demonstrated that matching the mutual information to the FEC code rate by adding artificial noise can 
compete with code rate-adaption via puncturing and shortening. Especially when the channel is noisy, 
the proposed method outperforms puncturing and shortening. This advantage comes partly from the 
reconciliation efficiency penalty inflicted by puncturing and shortening [8] and partly from the effect, 
that adding noise can actually increase the secret key rate under certain conditions [13]. 
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